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ABSTRACT
The Expected Free Energy (EFE) is a central quantity in the theory of active inference. It is the
quantity that all active inference agents are mandated to minimize through action, and its decompo-
sition into extrinsic and intrinsic value terms is key to the balance of exploration and exploitation
that active inference agents evince. Despite its importance, the mathematical origins of this quantity
and its relation to the Variational Free Energy (VFE) remain unclear. In this paper, we investigate
the origins of the EFE in detail and show that it is not simply "the free energy in the future". We
present a functional that we argue is the natural extension of the VFE, but which actively discourages
exploratory behaviour, thus demonstrating that exploration does not directly follow from free energy
minimization into the future. We then develop a novel objective, the Free-Energy of the Expected
Future (FEEF), which possesses both the epistemic component of the EFE as well as an intuitive
mathematical grounding as the divergence between predicted and desired futures.
The Free-Energy Principle (FEP) (K. Friston, 2010; K. Friston & Ao, 2012a; K. Friston, Kilner, & Harrison, 2006)
is an emerging theory from theoretical neuroscience which offers a unifying explanation of the dynamics of self-
organising systems (K. Friston, 2019; Parr, Da Costa, & Friston, 2020). It proposes that such systems can be inter-
preted as embodying a process of variational inference which minimizes a single information-theoretic objective – the
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Variational Free-Energy (VFE). In theoretical neuroscience, the FEP translates into an elegant account of brain func-
tion (K. Friston, 2003, 2005, 2008; K. J. Friston, 2008; K. J. Friston, Trujillo-Barreto, & Daunizeau, 2008), extending
the Bayesian Brain hypothesis (Deneve, 2005; Doya, Ishii, Pouget, & Rao, 2007; Knill & Pouget, 2004) by postulating
that the neural dynamics of the brain perform variational inference. Under certain assumptions about the forms of the
densities embodied by the agent, this theory can even be translated down to the level of neural circuits in the form of a
biologically plausible neuronal process theory (Bastos et al., 2012; K. Friston, 2008; Kanai, Komura, Shipp, & Friston,
2015; Shipp, 2016; Spratling, 2008).
Action is then subsumed into this formulation, under the name of active inference (K. Friston, 2011; K. Friston & Ao,
2012a; K. J. Friston, Daunizeau, & Kiebel, 2009) by mandating that agents act so as to minimize the VFE with re-
spect to action (Buckley, Kim, McGregor, & Seth, 2017; K. Friston et al., 2006). This casts action and perception
as two aspects of the same imperative of free-energy minimization, resulting in a theoretical framework for con-
trol which applies to a variety of continuous-time tasks (Baltieri & Buckley, 2017, 2018; Calvo & Friston, 2017;
K. Friston, Mattout, & Kilner, 2011; Millidge, 2019c).
Recent work has extended these ideas to account for inference over temporally extended action se-
quences. (K. Friston & Ao, 2012a; K. Friston, FitzGerald, Rigoli, Schwartenbeck, & Pezzulo, 2017a; K. Friston et al.,
2016, 2015; Tschantz, Seth, & Buckley, 2019). Here it is assumed that rather than action minimising
the instantaneous VFE, sequences of actions (or policies) minimise the cumulative sum over time of
a quantity called the Expected Free Energy (EFE) (K. Friston et al., 2015). Active inference using the
EFE has been applied to a wide variety of tasks and applications, from modelling human and ani-
mal choice behaviour (FitzGerald, Schwartenbeck, Moutoussis, Dolan, & Friston, 2015; K. Friston et al., 2015;
Pezzulo, Cartoni, Rigoli, Pio-Lopez, & Friston, 2016), simulating visual saccades and other ’epistemic foraging be-
haviour’ (K. J. Friston, Rosch, Parr, Price, & Bowman, 2018; Mirza, Adams, Mathys, & Friston, 2016; Parr & Friston,
2017a, 2018a), solving reinforcement learning benchmarks (Çatal, Verbelen, Nauta, De Boom, & Dhoedt, 2020;
Millidge, 2019a, 2019b; Tschantz, Baltieri, Seth, Buckley, et al., 2019; Ueltzhöffer, 2018; van de Laar & de Vries,
2019), to modelling psychiatric disorders as cases of aberrant inference (Cullen, Davey, Friston, & Moran, 2018;
Mirza, Adams, Parr, & Friston, 2019; Parr & Friston, 2018b). Moreover, active inference comes equipped with a bio-
logically plausible process theory with variational update equations which have been argued to be homologous with
observed neural firing patterns (K. Friston et al., 2017a; K. Friston, FitzGerald, Rigoli, Schwartenbeck, & Pezzulo,
2017b; K. J. Friston, Parr, & de Vries, 2017; Parr, Markovic, Kiebel, & Friston, 2019).
A key property of the EFE is that it decomposes into both an extrinsic, value-seeking, and an intrinsic (epistemic),
information-seeking term (K. Friston et al., 2015). The former induces active inference agents to seek out outcomes
which accord with prior beliefs, while the latter mandates active inference agents to resolve uncertainty by encour-
aging the exploration of unknown regions of the environment, a property which has been extensively investigated
(K. Friston et al., 2017a, 2015; K. J. Friston, Lin, et al., 2017; Schwartenbeck, FitzGerald, Dolan, & Friston, 2013;
Schwartenbeck et al., 2019). The fact that intrinsic drives naturally emerge from this formulation is argued as an advan-
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tage over other formulations that typically encourage exploration by adding ad-hoc exploratory terms to their loss func-
tion (Burda et al., 2018; Mohamed & Rezende, 2015; Oudeyer & Kaplan, 2009; Pathak, Agrawal, Efros, & Darrell,
2017). While the EFE is often described as a straightforward extension to the free energy principle that can account
for prospective policies and is typically expressed in similar mathematical form (Da Costa et al., 2020; K. Friston et al.,
2017a, 2015; Parr & Friston, 2017b, 2019), its origin remains obscure. Minimization of the EFE is sometimes moti-
vated by a reductio-ad-absurdum argument following from the FEP (K. Friston et al., 2015; Parr & Friston, 2019) in
that agents are driven to minimize the VFE, and therefore the only way they can act is to minimize their free-energy
into the future. Since the future is uncertain, however, instead they must minimize the expected free energy. Central
to this logic is the formal identification of the VFE with the EFE.
In this paper, we set out to investigate the origin of the EFE and its relations with the VFE. We provide a broader
perspective on this question, showing that the EFE is not the only way to extend the VFE to account for action-
conditioned futures. We derive an objective which we believe to be a more natural analogue of the VFE, which we call
the Free Energy of the Future (FEF), and make a detailed side-by-side comparison of the two functionals.Crucially,
we show that the FEF actively discourages information-seeking behaviour, thus demonstrating that epistemic terms do
not necessarily arise simply from extending the VFE into the future. We then investigate the origin of the epistemic
term of the EFE, and show that the EFE is just the FEF minus the negative of the epistemic term in the EFE, which
thus provides a straightforward perspective on the relation between the two functionals. We then propose our own
mathematically principled starting point for action-selection under active inference – the divergence between desired
and expected futures, and derive a novel bound on this quantity we call the Free-Energy of the Expected Future (FEEF),
which has close relations to the generalized free energy ((Parr & Friston, 2019)). We show that this objective has a
natural interpretation in terms of the divergence between a veridicial and a biased generative model, that it allows use
of the same functional for both inference and policy selection, and that it naturally decomposes into an extrinsic value
term and an epistemic action term, thus maintaining the attractive exploratory properties of EFE-based active inference
while also possessing a mathematically principled starting point and an intuitive interpretation.
1 The Variational Free Energy
The Variational Free Energy (VFE) is a core quantity in variational inference and constitutes a tractable
bound on both the log model evidence and the KL divergence between prior and posterior (Beal et al., 2003;
Blei, Kucukelbir, & McAuliffe, 2017; Fox & Roberts, 2012; Wainwright, Jordan, et al., 2008). For an in-depth mo-
tivation of the VFE and its use in variational inference, see Appendix A.
The VFE, defined at time t, denoted by Ft, is given by,
Ft = DKL[Q(xt|ot;φ)||p(ot, xt)]
= EQ(xt|ot;φ) ln
Q(xt|ot;φ))
p(ot, xt)
(1)
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The agent receives observations ot and must infer the values of hidden states xt. The agent assumes that the environ-
ment evolves according to a Markov process so that the distribution over states at the current time-step only depends on
the state at the previous time-step, and that the observation generated at the current time-step depends only on the state
at the current time-step. Given a distribution over a trajectory of states and observations, and under Markov assump-
tions it can be factorised as follows: p(o0:T , x0:T ) = p(x0)
∏T
t=1 p(ot|xt)p(xt|xt−1). In this paper, we also consider
inference over future states and observations which have yet to be observed. Such future variables are denoted oτ or xτ
where τ > t. To avoid dealing with infinite sums, agents only consider futures up to some finite time horizon, denoted
T . Q(xt|ot;φ) denotes an approximate posterior density parametrised by φ which, during the course of variational
inference, is fit as closely as possible to the true posterior. Note: there is a slight difference in notation here compared
to that usually used in variational inference. Normally the approximate posterior is written as Q(xt;φ) without the
dependence on o made explicit. This is because the variational posterior is not a direct function of observations, but
rather the result of an optimization process which depends on the observations.Here, we make the dependence on o
explicit to keep a clear distinction between the variational posterior Q(xt|ot;φ), obtained through optimization of the
variational parameters φ, and the variational prior Q(xt) = Ep(xt|xt−1)[Q(xt−1|ot−1;φ)], obtained by mapping the
previous posterior through the transition dynamics. Throughout this paper, we assume that inference is occurring in
a discrete-time Partially-Observed Markov Decision Process (POMDP). This is to ensure compatibility with the EFE
formulation later on, which is also situated within discrete-time POMDPs. 1
The utility of the VFE for inference comes from the fact that the VFE is equal to the divergence between true and
approximate posteriors up to a constant: Ft ≥ DKL[Q(xt|ot;φ))||p(xt|ot)]. Thus, minimizing Ft with respect to the
parameters of the variational distribution makes Q(xt|ot;φ) a good approximation of the true posterior.
One can also motivate the VFE as a technique to estimate model evidence. Log model evidence is a key quantity in
Bayesian inference but is often intractable, meaning it cannot be computed directly. Intuitively, the log model evidence
scores the likelihood of the data under a model, and thus provides a direct measure of the quality of a model. Under the
free energy principle, minimizing the negative log model evidence (or surprisal) is the ultimate goal of self-organising
systems (K. Friston & Ao, 2012a, 2012b; K. Friston et al., 2006). The VFE provides an upper bound on the log model
evidence. This can be shown by importance sampling the model evidence with respect to the approximate posterior,
1It is important to note that the original FEP was formulated in continuous time with generalised coordinates (K. Friston, 2008;
K. Friston et al., 2006) (where the hidden states are augmented with their temporal derivatives up to theoretically infinite order). The
generalised coordinates mean that the agent is effectively performing variational inference over a Taylor-expanded future trajectory
instead of a temporally-instant hidden state (K. J. Friston, 2008; K. J. Friston et al., 2008). Action is derived by minimizing the
gradients of the instantaneous VFE with respect to action, which requires the use of a forward model. More recent work on active
inference and the FEP returns to the continuous-time formulation (K. Friston, 2019; Parr et al., 2020) and the conclusions drawn in
this paper may look different in the continuous-time domain.
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and applying Jensen’s inequality:
ln p(ot) = ln
∫
dxt p(ot, xt)
= ln
∫
dxt p(ot, xt)
Q(xt|ot;φ))
Q(xt|ot;φ)
≤
∫
dxtQ(xt|ot;φ) ln
p(ot, xt)
Q(xt|ot;φ)
≤ DKL[Q(xt|ot;φ)||p(ot, xt)]
≤ Ft
Since the VFE is an upper bound on the log model evidence (or surprisal), as the VFE is minimized, it becomes an
increasingly accurate estimate of the surprisal. To get a feel for the properties of the VFE, we showcase the following
decomposition:
F = DKL[Q(xt|ot;φ)||p(ot, xt)]
= EQ(xt|ot;φ)) ln
[Q(xt|ot;φ)
p(ot, xt)
]
= −EQ(xt|ot;φ)[ln p(ot|xt)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Accuracy
+DKL[Q(xt|ot;φ))||p(xt)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Complexity
(2)
This decomposition is the one typically used to compute the VFE in practice and has a straightforward interpretation.
Specifically, minimizing the negative accuracy (and thus maximizing accuracy) ensures that the observations are as
likely as possible under the states, xt, predicted by the variational posterior while simultaneously minimizing the
complexity term, which is a KL divergence between the variational posterior and the prior. Thus the goal is to keep
the posterior as close to the prior as possible while still maximizing accuracy. Effectively, the complexity term acts as
an implicit regulariser, reducing the risk of overfitting to any specific observation.
2 The Expected Free Energy
While variational inference as presented above only allows us to perform inference at the current time given observa-
tions, it is possible to extend the formalism to allow for inference over actions or policies in the future.
To achieve this extension, a variational objective is required which can be minimized contingent upon future states
and policies, which will allow the problem of adaptive action selection to be reformulated as a process of variational
inference. To do this, the formalismmust be extended in two ways. First, the generative model is augmented to include
actions aτ , and policies, which are sequences of actions pi = [a1, a2...aT ]. The action taken at the current time can
affect future states, and thus future observations. In order to transform action selection into an inference problem,
policies are treated as an inferred distributionQ(pi) which is optimised to meet the agents goals. The second extension
required is to translate the notion of an agent’s goals into this probabilistic framework. Active inference encodes an
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agent’s goals as a desired distribution over observations p˜(oτ :T ).
2 This distribution is then incorporated into a biased
generative model of the world p˜(oτ , xτ ) ≈ p˜(oτ )Q(xτ |oτ ) 3, where we have additionally made the assumption that
the true posterior can be well approximated with the variational posterior: p(xτ |oτ ) ≈ Q(xτ |oτ ) which simply states
that the variational inference procedure was successful 4. Active inference proceeds by inferring a variational policy
distribution Q(pi) that maximizes the evidence for this biased generative model. Intuitively, this approach turns the
action selection problem on its head. Instead of saying: I have some goal, what do I have to do to achieve it? the active
inference agent asks: Given that my goals were achieved, what would have been the most probable actions that I took?
A further complication of extending VFE into the future comes from future observations. While agents have access
to current observations (or data) for planning problems, they must also reason about unknown future observations.
This is dealt with by taking the expectation of the objective with respect to predicted observations oτ drawn from the
generative model.
In the active inference framework, the goal is to infer a variational distribution over both hidden states and policies
that maximally fit to a biased generative model of the future. The framework defines the variational objective function
to be minimized, the Expected Free Energy, from time τ until the time horizon T , which is denoted G:
G = EQ(oτ:T ,xτ:T ,pi)[lnQ(xτ :T , pi)− ln p˜(oτ :T , xτ :T )]
A temporal mean-field factorisation of the approximate posterior and of the generative model is assumed such that
Q(xτ :T , pi) ≈ Q(pi)
∏T
τ Q(xτ |pi) and p˜(oτ :T , xτ :T ) ≈
∏T
t p˜(oτ )Q(xτ |oτ ). This factorisation neatly severs the tem-
poral dependencies between time-steps. Given these assumptions, inferring the optimalQ(pi), turns out to be relatively
straightforward.
G = EQ(oτ:T ,xτ:T ,pi)
[
lnQ(xτ :T , pi)− ln p˜(oτ :T , xτ :T )
]
= EQ(oτ:T ,xτ:T |pi)Q(pi)
[
lnQ(xτ :T |pi) + lnQ(pi)− ln p˜(oτ :T , xτ :T )
]
= EQ(pi)[lnQ(pi)− EQ(oτ:T ,xτ:T |pi)
[ T∑
t
[lnQ(xτ |pi)− ln p˜(oτ , xτ )]
]]
= DKL
[
Q(pi)‖e
∑
T
t
Gτ (pi)
]
2It is important to note that this encoding of preferences through a biased generative model is unique to active in-
ference. Other variational control schemes (Levine, 2018; K. Rawlik, Toussaint, & Vijayakumar, 2013; K. C. Rawlik, 2013;
E. Theodorou, Buchli, & Schaal, 2010; E. A. Theodorou & Todorov, 2012) instead encode desires through binary optimality vari-
ables and optimize the posterior given that the optimal path was taken. The relation between these frameworks is an interesting
avenue for future work.
3Some more recent work (Da Costa et al., 2020; K. Friston, 2019) prefers an alternative factorisation of the biased generative
model in terms of an unbiased likelihood and a biased prior state distribution ˜p(oτ , xτ ) = p(oτ |xτ )p˜(xτ ). This leads to a dif-
ferent decomposition of the EFE in terms of risk and ambiguity (see Appendix B) but which is mathematically equivalent to the
factorisation described here.
4For additional information on the effect of this assumption, see appendix D.
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Where Gτ (pi) = EQ(oτ ,xτ |pi)[lnQ(xτ |pi) − ln p˜(oτ , xτ )] is defined to be the EFE for a single time–step τ . From the
KL-divergence above, it follows that the optimal variational policy distribution Q∗(pi) is simply the path integral into
the future of the expected free energies for each individual time-step:
Q∗(pi) = σ(
T∑
t
Gτ (pi)),
where σ(x) is a softmax function. This implies that to infer the optimal policy distribution it suffices to minimize the
sum of expected free energies for each time step into the future. Inference proceeds by using the generative model
to rollout predicted futures, computing the EFE of those futures, and then selecting policies which minimize the sum
of the expected free energies. Since under temporal mean field assumptions, trajectories decompose into a sum of
time-steps, it is sufficient for the rest of the paper to only consider a single time-step τ .
To gain an intuition for the EFE, we showcase the following decomposition:
Gτ (pi) = EQ(oτ ,xτ |pi)[lnQ(xτ |pi)− ln p˜(oτ , xτ )]
≈ EQ(oτ ,xτ |pi)[lnQ(xτ |pi)− ln p˜(oτ )− lnQ(xτ |oτ )]
≈ −EQ(oτ ,xτ )
[
ln p˜(oτ )
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Extrinsic Value
−EQ(oτ )DKL[Q(xτ |oτ )||Q(xτ |pi)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Epistemic Value
(3)
While the EFE admits many decompositions, see Appendix B for a comprehensive overview, the one presented in
Equation 3 is perhaps the the most important because it separates the EFE into an extrinsic, goal-directed term and
an intrinsic, information-seeking term. The first term requires agents to maximize the likelihood of the desired obser-
vations p˜(oτ ) under beliefs about the future. It thus directs an agent to act to maximize the probability of its desires
occurring in the future. It is called the extrinsic value term since it is the term in the EFE which accounts for the
agent’s preferences.
The second term in equation 3 is the expected information gain, which is often termed the ’epistemic value’ since
it quantifies the amount of information gained by visiting a specific state. Since the information gain is negative,
minimizing the EFE as a whole mandatesmaximizing the expected information gain. This drives the agent to maximize
the divergence between its posterior and prior beliefs, thus inducing the agent to take actions which maximally inform
their beliefs and reduce uncertainty. It is the combination of extrinsic and intrinsic value terms which underlies
active inference’s claim to have a principled approach to the exploration-exploitation dilemma (K. Friston et al., 2017a,
2015).
The idea of maximizing expected information gain or "Bayesian surprise" (Itti & Baldi, 2009) to drive exploratory
behaviour has been argued for in neuroscience (Baldi & Itti, 2010; Ostwald et al., 2012), and has been regularly pro-
posed in reinforcement learning (Houthooft et al., 2016; Still & Precup, 2012; Sun, Gomez, & Schmidhuber, 2011;
Tschantz, Millidge, Seth, & Buckley, 2020). It is important to note however that in these prior works, information
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gain has often been proposed as an ad-hoc addition to an already existing objective function with only the intuitive
justification of boosting exploration. In contrast, expected information gain falls naturally out of the EFE formalism,
arguably lending the formalism a degree of theoretical elegance.
3 Origins of the EFE
Given the centrality of the EFE to the active inference framework, it is important to explore the origin and nature
of this quantity. The EFE is typically motivated through a reductio-ad-absurdum argument (K. Friston et al., 2015;
Parr & Friston, 2019)5. The logic is as follows. Agents have prior beliefs over policies that drive action selection. By
the FEP, all states of an organism, including those determining policies, must change so as to minimize free energy.
Thus, the only self-consistent prior belief over policies is that the agent will minimize free-energy into the future
through its policy selection process. If the agent did not have such a prior belief then it would select policies which
did not minimize the free-energy into the future and would thus not be a free-energy minimizing agent. This logic
requires a well-defined notion of the free-energy of future states and observations given a specific policy. The active
inference literature implicitly assumes that the EFE is the natural functional which fits this notion (K. Friston et al.,
2017b, 2015). In the following section, we argue that the EFE is not in fact the only functional which can quantify the
notion of the free energy of policy-conditioned futures, and indeed we propose a different functional The Free Energy
of the Future, which we argue is a more natural extension of the VFE to account for future states.
3.1 The Free Energy of the Future
We argue that the natural extension of the free energy into the future must possess direct analogs to the two crucial
properties of the VFE: it must be expressible as a KL-divergence between a posterior and a generative model, such that
minimizing it causes the variational density to better approximate the true posterior. Secondly, it must also bound the
log model evidence of future observations. Bounding the log model evidence (or surprisal) is vital since the surprisal
is the core quantity which, under the FEP, all systems are driven to minimize. If the VFE extended into the future
failed to bound the surprisal, then minimizing this extension would not necessarily minimize surprisal, and thus any
agent which minimized such an extension would be in violation of the FEP. Here, we present a functional which we
claim satisfies these desiderata – the Free Energy of the Future (FEF).
We wish to derive an expression for variational free energy at some future time τ that is conditioned on some policy pi.
In other words, we wish to quantify the free energy that will occur at some future time point, given some sequence of
actions. Here, we derive a form of the ‘variational free energy of the future’, denoted FEFτ (pi), by keeping the same
terms as the VFE (Equation 1), but conditioning the variational distributions on our policy of interest and rewriting for
5An alternative motivation exists which situates the expected free energy in terms of a non-equilibrium steady state distribution
(Da Costa et al., 2020; K. Friston, 2019; Parr, 2019). This argument reframes everything in terms of a Gibbs free-energy, from
which the EFE can be derived as a special case. The problem becomes, then, one of the motivation of the Gibbs free-energy as an
objective function.
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the future time-point τ . Additionally, since observations in the future are unknown, we must evaluate our free energy
under the expectation of our beliefs about future observations, as in the EFE. We thus define:
FEFτ (pi) = EQ(oτ ,xτ |pi)[lnQ(xτ |oτ )− ln p˜(oτ , xτ )]
Since this equation is simply the KL-divergence between the variational posterior and the generative model, it satisfies
the first desideratum. We next investigate the properties of the FEF by showcasing one key decomposition. As with
the the VFE, we can then split the FEF into an energy and an entropy or an accuracy and complexity term, which
correspond to the extrinsic and epistemic action terms in the EFE:
FEFτ (pi) = EQ(oτ |pi)DKL[Q(xτ |oτ )||p˜(oτ , xτ )]
≈ −EQ(oτ ,xτ |pi)
[
ln p˜(oτ |xτ )
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Accuracy
+EQ(oτ )DKL[Q(xτ |oτ )||Q(xτ |pi)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Complexity
Unlike the EFE however, the expected information gain (complexity term) is positive, while in the EFE, it is negative.
Since we wish to minimize both the FEF and the EFE, the FEF mandates us to minimize the information gain while
the EFE requires us to maximize it. An FEF agent thus tries to maximize its reward while trying to explore as little as
possible. While this sounds surprising, it is in fact directly analogous to the complexity term in the VFE (equation 2),
which mandates maximizing the likelihood of an observation, while also keeping the posterior as close as possible to
the prior.
3.2 Bounds on the Expected Model Evidence
We next show how the FEF can be derived as a bound on the expected model evidence satisfying the second desidara-
tum. We define the expected model evidence to be a straightforward extension of the model-evidence to unknown
future states. The expected log model evidence for a trajectory from the current time-step t to some time horizon T is:
Ep(ot:T )
[
ln p˜(ot:T )
]
This objective states that we wish to maximize the probability of being in a desired trajectory p˜(ot:T ), expected
under the distribution of our beliefs about our likely future trajectories p(ot:T ). Given a Markov generative model
p(o1:T , x1:T ) =
∏T
t p(ot|xt)p(xt|xt−1), and assuming that the approximate posterior factorises Q(x1:T |o1:T ) =∏T
t Q(xt|ot), the expected model evidence factorises across time-steps, it suffices to show the derivation for a single
time-step τ > t (see Appendix C for a full trajectory derivation). We further define Q(oτ , xτ ) = p(oτ )Q(xτ |oτ ) =
p(oτ |xτ )Q(xτ ). We therefore take the expected model evidence for a single time-step, and show that the FEF is a
9
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bound on this quantity.
−Ep(oτ )
[
ln p˜(oτ )
]
= −Ep(oτ )
[
ln
∫
dxτ p˜(oτ , xτ )
]
= −Ep(oτ )
[
ln
∫
dxτ p˜(oτ , xτ )
Q(xτ |oτ )
Q(xτ |oτ )
]
≤ −Ep(oτ )
∫
dxτQ(xτ |oτ )
[
ln
p˜(oτ , xτ )
Q(xτ |oτ )
]
≤ −EQ(oτ ,xτ)
[
ln
p˜(oτ , xτ )
Q(xτ |oτ )
]
≤ EQ(oτ ,xτ )
[
ln
Q(xτ |oτ )
p˜(oτ , xτ )
]
≤ EQ(oτ )DKL[Q(x|oτ )||p˜(oτ , xτ |pi)] = FEF (4)
Crucially, this is an upper bound on expected model evidence which can be tightened by minimizing the FEF. By
contrast, returning to the EFE, we see below that since KL divergences are always ≥ 0, the expected information gain
is always positive, and so the EFE is a lower bound on the expected model evidence:
Gτ (pi) = EQ(oτ ,xτ |pi)[lnQ(xτ |pi)− ln p˜(oτ , xτ )]
≈ −EQ(oτ ,xτ )
[
ln p˜(oτ )
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected Model Evidence
−EQ(oτ )DKL[Q(xτ |oτ )||Q(xτ |pi)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected Information Gain
Since the expected information gain is an expected KL divergence, it must be ≥ 0, and thus the negative expected
information gain must be ≤ 0. Since the EFE aims to minimize negative information gain (thus maximizing positive
information gain), we can see minimizing the EFE actually drives it further from the expected model evidence. 6
We further investigate the EFE and its properties as a bound in Appendix D. Additionally, in Appendix E we re-
view other attempts in the literature to derive the EFE as a bound on the expected model evidence and discuss their
shortcomings.
3.3 The EFE and the FEF
To get a stronger intuition for the subtle differences between the EFE and the FEF, we present a detailed side-by-side
comparison of the two functionals.
FEF = EQ(oτ ,xτ |pi)[lnQ(xτ |oτ )− ln p˜(oτ , xτ )]
EFE = EQ(oτ ,xτ |pi)[lnQ(xτ |pi)− ln p˜(oτ , xτ )]
6There is a slight additional subtlety here involving the fact that there is also a posterior approximation error term which is
positive. In general the EFE functions as an upper bound when the posterior error is greater than the information gain and a lower
bound when the posterior error is smaller. Since the goal of variational inference is to minimize posterior error, and EFE agents are
driven to maximize expected information gain, we expect this latter condition to occur rarely. For more detail see Appendix D.
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While the two formulations might initially look very similar, the key difference is the variational term. The FEF,
analogously to the VFE, measures the difference between a variational posterior Q(xτ |oτ ) and the generative model
Q(xτ |pi). The EFE, on the other hand, measures the difference between a variational prior and the generative model.
It is this difference which makes the EFE not a straightforward extension to the VFE for future time-steps, and under-
writes its unique epistemic value term.
We now demonstrate that both the EFE and the FEF can be decomposed into an expected likelihood, associated with
extrinsic value, and an expected KL-divergence between a variational posterior and a variational prior, associated with
epistemic value. We factorise the generative model in the FEF into the (biased) likelihood and a variational prior, and
factorise the generative model in the EFE into an approximate posterior, and a (biased) marginal:
FEF = EQ(oτ ,xτ |pi)[lnQ(xτ |oτ )− ln p˜(oτ |xτ )− lnQ(xτ |pi)]
EFE = EQ(oτ ,xτ |pi)[lnQ(xτ |pi)− ln p˜(oτ )− lnQ(xτ |oτ )]
The variational prior and variational posterior can then be combined in both the FEF and the FEF to form epistemic
terms. Crucially, the epistemic value term is positive in the FEF and negative in the EFE, meaning that the FEF
penalizes epistemic behavior whereas the EFE promotes it:
FEF = −EQ(oτ ,xτ |pi)
[
ln p˜(oτ |xτ )
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Extrinsic Value
+EQ(oτ )DKL[Q(xτ |oτ )||Q(xτ |pi)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Epistemic Value
(5)
EFE = −EQ(oτ ,xτ)
[
ln p˜(oτ )
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Extrinsic Value
−EQ(oτ )DKL[Q(xτ |oτ )||Q(xτ |pi)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Epistemic Value
Equation 5. demonstrates that the FEF and EFE can be decomposed in similar fashion. We note that the extrinsic value
term for the FEF is a likelihood and a marginal for the EFE. The most important difference, however, lies in the sign
of the epistemic value term. Since we wish to minimize both the FEF and the EFE, the FEF mandates us to minimize
information gain while the EFE requires us to maximize it. An FEF agent thus tries to maximize its extrinsic value
while trying to explore as little as possible. A key question then arises: where does the positive information gain in the
EFE come from?
While this difference in the sign of the expected information gain term may speak to some deep connection between
the two quantities, here we offer a pragmatic perspective on the matter. We show that a possible route to the EFE is
simply that it is the FEF minus the expected information-gain. This implies that the epistemic value term of the EFE
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arises not from some connection to variational inference but is present by construction:
FEFτ (pi)− IGτ = EQ(oτ ,xτ |pi) ln(
Q(xτ |oτ )
p˜(oτ , xτ )
)− EQ(oτ ,xτ |pi) ln(
Q(xτ |oτ )
Q(xτ |pi)
)
= EQ(oτ ,xτ |pi) ln(
Q(xτ |oτ )Q(xτ |pi)
p˜(oτ , xτ )Q(xτ |oτ )
)
= EQ(oτ ,xτ |pi) ln(
Q(xτ |pi)
p˜(oτ , xτ )
)
= EFE(pi)τ
While this proof illustrates the relation between the EFE and the FEF, it is theoretically unsatisfying as an account of
the origin of the EFE. A large part of the appeal of the EFE is that it purports to show that epistemic value arises ’natu-
rally’ out of minimizing free-energy into the future. In contrast, here we have shown that minimizing free-energy into
the future requires no commitment to exploratory behaviour. While this does not question the usefulness of using an
information gain term for exploration, or the use of the EFE as a loss function, it does raise questions about the math-
ematically principled nature of the objective. It is thus not straightforward to see why agents are directly mandated by
the FEP to minimize the EFE specifically, as opposed to some other free-energy functional. While this fact may at first
appear concerning, we believe it ultimately enhances the power of the formalism by licensing the extension of active in-
ference to encompass other objective functions in a principled manner (Biehl, Guckelsberger, Salge, Smith, & Polani,
2018). In the following section, we propose an alternative objective to the EFE, which results in the same information-
seeking epistemic value term, but derives it in a mathematically principled and intuitive way as a bound on the diver-
gence between expected and desired futures.
4 Free Energy of the Expected Future
In this section, we propose a novel objective functional which we call The Free-Energy of The Expected Future
(FEEF) which possesses the same epistemic value term as the EFE, while additionally possessing a more naturalistic
and intuitive grounding. We begin with the intuition that, to act adaptively, agents should act so as to minimize the
difference between what they predict will happen, and what they desire to happen. Put another way, adaptive action
for an agent consists of forcing reality to unfold according to its’ preferences. We can mathematically formulate this
objective as the KL divergence between desired and expected trajectories of future observations. We thus wish to
choose the policy that minimizes this divergence.
pi∗ = argmin
pi
DKL[p(ot:T |pi)||p˜(ot:T )]
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While this KL divergence is difficult to minimize directly 7 due the marginal densities, we show below that it is possible
to derive the FEEF as a tractable bound on this divergence.
DKL[p(ot:T |pi)||p˜(ot:T )] = Ep(ot:T |pi) ln
[p(ot:T |pi)
p˜(ot:T )
]
= Ep(ot:T |pi) ln
[ ∫
dxt:T
p(ot:T , xt:T |pi)
p˜(ot:T )
]
= Ep(ot:T |pi) ln
[ ∫
dxt:T
p(ot:T , xt:T |pi)Q(xt:T |ot:T )
p˜(ot:T )Q(xt:T |ot:T )
]
≤ Ep(ot:T |pi)
∫
dxt:TQ(xt:T |ot:T ) ln
[ p(ot:T , xt:T |pi)
p˜(ot:T )Q(xt:T |ot:T )
]
≤ EQ(ot:T ,xt:T |pi) ln
[p(ot:T , xt:T |pi)
p˜(ot:T , xt:T )
]
≤ FEEF(pi)τ
The FEEF can be interpreted as the divergence between a veridicial and a biased generative model, and thus furnishes
a direct intuition of the goals of a FEEF-minimizing agent. The divergence objective compels the agent to bring the
biased and the veridicial generative model into alignment. Since the predictions of the biased generative model are
heavily biased towards the agents’ a-priori preferences, the only way to achieve this alignment is to act so as to make
the veridicial generative model predict desired outcomes in line with the biased generative model. The FEEF objective
encompasses the standard active inference intuition of an agent acting through biased inference to maximize accuracy
of a biased model. However, the maintenance of two separate generative models (one biased and one veridicial) also
helps finesse the conceptual difficulty of how the agent manages to make accurate posterior inferences and future
predictions about complex dynamics if all it has access to is a biased generative model. It seems straightforward
that the biased model would also bias these crucial parts of inference which need to be unimpaired for the scheme
to function at all. However, by keeping both a veridicial generative model (the same one used at the present time
and learnt through environmental interactions), and a biased generative model (created by systematically biasing a
temporary copy of the veridicial model), we elegantly separate the need for both veridicial and biased inferential
components for future prediction 8
7This remark primarily applies to complex or continuous latent variable models. In simple discrete worlds with a small number
of states, the necessary marginalizations can be computed as a simple sum over a small number of finite states. In these cases
this KL can be computed exactly and any approximation is unnecessary. On the other hand, in such cases any variational scheme
is unnecessary, since the state space is small enough that simply computing Bayes rule directly is possible. The key difficulty in
computing posteriors with Bayes rule is the marginal evidence p(ot:T ) which is also the key computation in this KL.
8This approach bears a resemblance to that taken in (K. Friston, 2019) which separates the evolving dynamical policy-dependent
density of the agent, and a desired steady state density which is policy-invariant. This approach arises from deep thermodynamic
considerations in continuous time, while ours is applicable to discrete time reinforcement learning frameworks.
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Similarly to the EFE, the FEEF objective can be decomposed into an extrinsic and an intrinsic term. We compare this
directly to the EFE decomposition:
FEEF(pi)τ = Ep(oτ ,xτ |pi) ln
[p(oτ , xτ |pi)
p˜(oτ , xτ )
]
= EQ(xτ |pi)DKL
[
p(oτ |xτ )‖p˜(oτ )
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Extrinsic Value
−EQ(oτ |pi)DKL
[
Q(xτ |oτ )‖Q(xτ |pi)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Intrinsic Value
EFE = −EQ(oτ ,xτ |pi)
[
ln p˜(oτ )
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Extrinsic Value
−EQ(oτ |pi)DKL[Q(xτ |oτ )||Q(xτ |pi)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Intrinsic Value
The first thing to note is that the intrinsic value terms of the FEEF and the EFE are identical such that FEEF-minimizing
agents will necessarily show identical epistemic behaviour to EFE-minimizing agents. Unlike the EFE, however,
the FEEF also possesses a strong naturalistic grounding as a bound on a theoretically relevant quantity. The FEEF
can maintain both its information-maximizing imperative and its theoretical grounding since it is derived from the
minimization of a KL divergence rather than the maximization of a log model evidence.
The key difference with the EFE lies in the likelihood term. While the EFE simply tries to maximize the expected
evidence of the desired observations, the FEEF minimizes the KL divergence between the likelihood of observations
predicted under the veridicial generative model 9 and the marginal likelihood of observations under the biased gener-
ative model. This difference is effectively equivalent to an additional veridicial generative model likelihood entropy
term H[p(oτ |xτ )] subtracted from the EFE. The extrinsic value term thus encourages the agent to choose its actions
such that its predictions over states lead to observations which are close to its preferred observations, while also
trying move to states whereby the entropy over observations is maximized, thus leading the agent to move towards
states where the generative model is not as certain about the likely outcome. In effect, the FEEF possesses another
exploratory term, in addition to the information gain, which the EFE lacks.
Another important advantage of the FEEF is that it is mathematically equivalent to the VFE in the present time with a
current observation. This is because when we have a real observation, the distribution over the possible observations
collapses to a delta distribution, so that the outer expectation has no effect. Simultaneously, the distribution over
desired observations also collapses to a delta at the real-observation, given that (barring counterfactual reasoning
capability), one cannot usefully desire things to be other than how they are at the present moment. This means that
theoretically we can consider an agent to be both inferring and planning using the same objective, which is not true of
the EFE. The EFE does not reduce to the VFE when observations are known, and thus requires a separate objective
function to be minimized for planning compared to inference. Because of this, it is actually possible to argue that FEEF
is mandated by the free-energy principle. On this view there is no distinction between present and future inference and
both follow from minimizing the same objective but under different informational constraints.
9The term ’veridicial’ needs some contextualising. We simply mean that the model is not biased towards the agent’s desires.
The veridicial generative model is not required to be a perfectly accurate map of the agent’s entire world, only of action-relevant
sub-manifolds of the total space (Tschantz, Seth, & Buckley, 2019).
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Since the FEEF and the EFE are identical in their intrinsic value term, and share deep similarities in their extrinsic
term, we believe that the FEEF can serve as a relatively straightforward "plug-in replacement" for the EFE for many
active inference agents. Moreover, it has a much more straightforward intuitive basis than the EFE, is arguably a better
continuation of the VFE into the future, and possesses a strong naturalistic grounding as a bound on the divergence
between predicted and desired futures.
5 Discussion
We believe it is valuable at this point to step back from the morass of various free-energies and take stock of what
has been achieved. Firstly, we have shown that it is not possible to directly derive epistemic value from variational
inference objectives which serve as a bound on model evidence. However, it is possible to derive epistemic value terms
from divergences between expected and desired states. A deep intuitive understanding of why this is the case is an
interesting avenue for future work. The intuition behind the FEEF as a divergence between desired and expected future
observations is also similar to probabilistic formulations of the reinforcement learning problem (Attias, 2003; Kappen,
2005; Levine, 2018; Toussaint, 2009), which typically try to minimize the divergence between a controlled trajectory,
and an optimal trajectory (Kappen, 2007; E. A. Theodorou & Todorov, 2012; Williams, Aldrich, & Theodorou, 2017).
These schemes also obtain some degree of (undirected) exploratory behaviour through their objective functionals
which contain entropy terms and the FEEF can be seen as a way of extending these schemes to partially-observed
environments. Understanding precisely how active inference and the free-energy principle relate mathematically to
such schemes is another fruitful avenue for future work.
It seems intuitive that a Bayes-optimal solution to the exploration-exploitation dilemma should arise directly out
of the formulation of reward maximization as inference, given that sources of uncertainty are correctly quantified.
However, in this paper, we have shown that merely quantifying uncertainty in states and observations through mean-
field-factorised time-steps is insufficient to derive such a principled solution to the dilemma, as seen by the exploration-
discouraging behaviour of the FEF. We therefore believe that to derive Bayes optimal exploration policies in the context
of active-learning – such that we have to select actions that give us the most information now to use in the future to
maximize rewards – it is likely to require both modelling multiple interconnected time-steps, as well as the mechanics
of learning with parameters and update rules, and correctly quantifying the uncertainties therein. This is beyond the
scope of this paper, but is a very interesting avenue for future work.
The comparison of the FEEF and the EFE also raises an interesting philosophical point about the number and types
of generative models employed in the active-inference formalism. One interpretation of the FEEF is in terms of two
generative models, but other interpretations are possible such as between a single unbiased generative model and a
simple density of desired states and observations. It is also important to note that due to requiring different objective
functions for inference and planning, the EFE also formulation appears to implicitly require two generative models –
the generativemodel of future states, and the generativemodel of states in the future (K. Friston et al., 2015). While the
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mathematical formalism is relatively straightforward, the philosophical question of how to translate the mathematical
objects into ontological objects called ’generative models’ is unclear and progress on this front would be useful in
determining the philosophical status, and perhaps even neural implementation of active inference.
The implications of our results for studies of active inference are varied. Nothing in what we have shown argues
directly against the use of the EFE as a objective for an active inference agent. However, we believe we have shown
that the EFE is not the necessarily the only, or even the natural, objective function to use. We thus follow (Biehl et al.,
2018) in encouraging experimentation with different objective functions for active inference. We especially believe
that our objective, the FEEF future has promise due its intuitive interpretation, largely equivalent terms to the EFE,
its straightforward use of two generative models rather than just a single biased one, and its close connections to
similar probabilistic objectives used in variational reinforcement learning, while also maintaining the crucial epistemic
properties of the EFE. Moreover, while in this paper we have argued for the FEF instead of the EFE as a direct extension
of the VFE into the future, the logical requirements of exactly which functional (if any) is, in fact, mandated by the
free-energy principle remains open. We believe that elucidating the exact constraints which the free-energy principle
places upon a theory of variational action, and understanding more deeply the relations between the various free-
energies, could shed light on deep questions regarding notions of Bayes-optimal epistemic action in self-organising
systems.
Finally, it is important to note that although in this paper we have solely been concerned with the EFE and active
inference in discrete-time POMDPs, the original intuitions and mathematical framework of the free-energy principle
arose out of a continuous time formulation, deeply interwoven with concerns from information theory and statistical
physics (K. Friston, 2019; K. Friston & Ao, 2012b; K. Friston et al., 2006; Parr et al., 2020). As such there may be
deep connections between the EFE, FEF, and log model evidence which exist only in the continuous time limit, and
which furnish a mathematically principled origin of epistemic action.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have examined in detail the nature and origin of the EFE. We have shown that it is not a direct analog
of the VFE extended into the future. We then derived a novel objective, the FEF, which we claimed is a more natural
extension and shown that it lacks the beneficial epistemic value term of the EFE. We then proved that this term arises
in the EFE directly as a result of its non-standard definition since the EFE can be expressed as just the EFE minus
the expected information gain. Taking this into account, we then proposed another objective, the Free Energy of the
Expected Future (FEEF) which attempts to get the best of both worlds by preserving the desirable information-seeking
properties of the EFE, while also maintaining a mathematically principled origin.
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A Variational Inference
To motivate the variational free-energy, and variational inference more generally, we setup a standard inference prob-
lem. Let us say we are an agent that exists in a partially observed world. We have some observation ot, and from this
we wish to infer the hidden state of the world xt. That is, we want to compute the posterior p(xt|ot). While we do not
know this posterior directly, we do possess a generative model of the world. This is a model that maps from hidden
states to observations. Mathematically, we possess p(ot, xt) = p(ot|xt)p(xt). Since computing the true posterior ex-
actly is likely intractable, the strategy in variational inference is to try to approximate this density with a tractable one
Q(xt|ot;φ) which we postulate, and thus have full control over. While the true posterior might be arbitrarily complex,
we might define Q(xt|ot;φ) to be a Gaussian distribution: Q(xt|ot;φ) = N (x;µφ, σφ), for instance. Given that we
have this variational density Q, parametrised by some parameters φ, the goal is to adjust the parameters to make Q as
close as possible to the true posterior p(xt|ot). Mathematically speaking, this means we want to minimize:
argminφDKL[Q(xt|ot;φ)||p(xt|ot)]
Where DKL[Q‖P ] is the Kullback-Leibler divergence. This initially doesn’t seem to have bought us much. We wish
to minimize the divergence between the variational density q and the true posterior p(xt|ot). However, by assumption,
we do not know the true posterior. So how can we possibly minimize this divergence if we do not know one of the parts?
This is where we use the key trick of variational inference. By Bayes’ theorem we know that: p(xt|ot) =
p(ot|xt)p(xt)
p(ot)
we we can thus substitute this into the KL divergence term.
argminφDKL[Q(xt|ot;φ)||p(xt|ot)] = argminφDKL[Q(xt|ot;φ)||
p(ot|xt)p(xt)
p(ot)
]
= EQ(xt|ot;φ)[ln(
Q(xt|ot;φ)p(ot)
p(ot|xt)p(xt)
)]
= EQ(xt|ot;φ)[ln(
Q(xt|ot;φ)
p(ot|xt)p(xt)
)] + EQ(xt|ot;φ)[ln p(ot)]
= DKL[Q(xt|ot;φ)||p(ot|xt)p(xt)] + ln p(ot) (6)
In step 2 we have applied Bayes’ theorem the the posterior. In step 3 we have simply utilized the definition of the KL-
divergenceDKL[Q||P ] = EQ ln(
Q
P
). In step 4 we have then applied the property of logs that ln(a∗b) = ln(a)+ln(b).
In step 5 we then recognise that the remaining first term is now a KL divergence between the variational posterior and
the generative model. We also recognise that since the ln p(ot) term has no dependence on x or φ, the expectation
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EQ(xt|ot;φ)[ln p(ot)] vanishes leaving just the ln p(ot) term alone. It is important to note that the KL term in equation
6 is now between two things we can actually compute – the variational posterior, which we control, and the generative
model, which we assume that we know. The remaining ln p(ot) term is called the log model evidence and it is
incomputable in general. However, since it is not affected by the parameters φ of the variational density, then it does
not affect the minimization and so for the purposes of the minimization process can be ignored. We can thus write out
what we have defined as
DKL[Q(xt|ot;φ)||p(xt|ot)] = DKL[Q(xt|ot;φ)||p(ot|xt)p(xt)] + ln p(ot)
⇒ DKL[Q(xt|ot;φ)||p(ot|xt)p(xt)] ≥ DKL[Q(xt|ot;φ)||p(xt|ot)]
This implies that the KL divergence between the variational density and the generative model is always greater than
or equal to the KL divergence between the true and variational posteriors. This first KL divergence is computable
and we call it the variational free-energy F . Since F is an upper bound on the divergence between the true posterior
and the variational posterior, which is what we really want to minimize, then if we minimize F , we are constantly
pushing that bound lower and thus largely minimizing the divergence between the true and variational posterior. As an
additional bonus, when the true and variational posteriors are approximately equal: DKL[Q(xt|ot;φ)||p(xt|ot)] ≈ 0
thenDKL[Q(xt|ot;φ)||p(ot|xt)p(xt)] ≈ − ln p(ot), which means that the final value of the variational-free-energy is
thus equal to the negative log model evidence. Since the log model evidence is a very useful quantity to compute for
Bayesian model selection, it effectively means that once we have finished fitting our model, we are automatically left
with a measure of how good our model is.
In effect the variational free energy is useful because it has two properties. The first is that it is an upper bound
on the divergence between the true and approximate posterior. By adjusting our approximate posterior to minimize
this bound, we drive it closer to the true posterior, thus achieving more accurate inference. Secondly, the variational
free-energy is a bound on the log model evidence. This is an important term which scores the likelihood of the data
observed given your model and so can be used in Bayesian model selection.
The log model evidence takes on an additional importance in terms of the free-energy principle, since the negative
log model evidence − ln p(ot) is surprisal, which all agents, it is propsed are driven to minimize (K. Friston, 2010;
K. Friston & Ao, 2012b; K. Friston et al., 2006). This is because the expected log model evidence is the entropy of
observations, the minimisation of which is postulated as a necessary condition for any self-sustaining organism to
maintain itself as a unique system. The free-enregy minimization comes about since the VFE is, as we have seen a
tractable bound on the log model evidence, or surprisal.
The VFE can be decomposed in three principle ways, which each showcases a different facet of the objective.
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F = DKL[Q(xt|ot;φ)||p(ot, xt)]
= EQ(xt|ot;φ) ln
Q(xt|ot;φ)
p(ot, xt)
= EQ(xt|ot;φ)[lnQ(xt|ot;φ)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Entropy
−EQ(xt|ot;φ)[ln p(ot, xt)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Energy
= −EQ(xt|ot;φ)[ln p(ot|xt)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Accuracy
+DKL[Q(xt|ot;φ)||p(xt)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Complexity
= − ln p(ot)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Log Model Evidence
+DKL[Q(xt|ot;φ)||p(xt|ot)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Posterior Divergence
In the first entropy-energy decomposition, we simply split the KL divergence using the properties of logarithms so
that the numerator of the fraction becomes the entropy term and the denominator becomes the energy term.. If
we are seeking to minimize the variational-free-energy then this means we need to both minimize the negative en-
tropy (since entropy is defined as −EQ(xt)[lnQ(xt)] and also minimize the negative energy (or maximize the energy)
EQ(xt|ot;φ)[ln p(ot, xt)]. This can be interpreted as saying we require that the variational posterior be as entropic as
possible while also maximizing the likelihood that the xs proposed as probable by the variational posterior also be
judged as probable under the generative model.
The second decomposition into accuracy and complexity perhaps has a more straightforward interpretation. We wish
to minimize the negative accuracy (and thus maximize the accuracy), which means we want the actually observed
observation to be as likely as possible under the xs predicted by the variational posterior. However, we also want to
minimize the complexity term which is a KL divergence between the variational posterior and the prior. That is, we
wish to keep the posterior as close to our the as possible while still maximizing accuracy. The complexity term then
functions as a kind of implicit regulariser, making sure we do not overfit to any specific observation.
The final decomposition speaks to the inferential functions of the VFE. It serves as an upper bound on the log model
evidence, since the posterior divergence term, as a KL divergence, is always positive. Moreover, we see that by
minimizing the free-energy, we must also be minimizing the posterior divergence, which is the difference between
the approximate and true posterior, and we are thus improving our variational approximation. This is because the
log model evidence is constant, and so if the VFE is decreasing, it must be doing so through the minimization of the
posterior divergence.
B Decompositions of the EFE
In this section we provide a comprehensive overview of the many decompositions of the EFE. The EFE is defined as:
G(pi)τ = EQ(oτ ,xτ |pi)[lnQ(xτ |pi)− ln p˜(oτ , xτ )]
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The standard decomposition is into the extrinsic term (expected log likelihood of the desired observations) and an
epistemic term (the information gain, or KL divergence between variational prior and posterior from the generative
model.
EQ(oτ ,xτ |pi)[lnQ(xτ |pi)− ln p˜(oτ , xτ )] = EQ(oτ ,xτ |pi)[− ln p˜(oτ )− ln p(xτ |oτ ) + lnQ(xτ |pi)]
= −EQ(oτ ,xτ |pi)
[
ln p˜(oτ )
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Extrinsic Value
−EQ(oτ )DKL[Q(xτ |oτ )||Q(xτ |pi)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Epistemic Value
Similar to the VFE, it is also possible to split it into an energy and an entropy term. While the energy term is similar
to the VFE as the expectation of the generative model (albeit an expectation over the joint instead of the posterior), the
entropy term is different as it is the entropy of the variational prior, not the approximate posterior, which results.
G(pi)τ = EQ(oτ ,xτ |pi)[lnQ(xτ |pi)− ln p˜(oτ , xτ )]
= EQ(oτ ,xτ |pi)[lnQ(xτ |pi)]− EQ(oτ ,xτ |pi)[ln p˜(oτ , xτ )]
= −EQ(oτ |xτ )H
[
Q(xτ |pi)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Entropy
−EQ(oτ ,xτ |pi)[ln p˜(oτ , xτ )]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Energy
It is also possible to decompose the biased generative model the other way around, thus in line with that of the VFE to
derive:
G(pi)τ = EQ(oτ ,xτ |pi)[lnQ(xτ |pi)− ln p˜(oτ , xτ )]
= EQ(oτ ,xτ |pi)[lnQ(xτ |pi)− ln p˜(oτ |xτ )− ln p(xτ )]
= −EQ(o,x|pi) ln p˜(oτ |xτ )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Accuracy
+EQ(oτ |xτ)DKL
[
Q(xτ |pi)‖p(xτ )
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Complexity
Unlike the VFE, however the divergence is between the variational prior and the true prior, rather than between the
variational posterior and the true prior. Finally, the EFE can also be represented in observation space by using Bayes’
rule to flip the likelihoods and priors.
G(pi) = EQ(oτ ,xτ |pi)[lnQ(xτ |pi)− ln p˜(oτ , xτ )]
= EQ(oτ ,xτ |pi)[lnQ(xτ |pi)− ln p˜(oτ )− lnQ(xτ |oτ )]
= EQ(oτ ,xτ |pi)[lnQ(xτ |pi)− ln p˜(oτ )− lnQ(oτ |xτ )− lnQ(xτ |pi) + lnQ(oτ ))]
= EQ(oτ ,xτ |pi)[− ln p˜(oτ )− lnQ(oτ |xτ ) + lnQ(oτ ))]
= EQ(xτ |pi)H
[
Q(oτ |xτ )
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Predicted Uncertainty
−EQ(xτ |oτ )DKL
[
Q(oτ )‖p˜(oτ )
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Predicted Divergence
= −EQ(xτ |pi)[ln p˜(oτ )]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Extrinsic Value
−EQ(xτ |pi)DKL
[
Q(oτ |xτ )‖Q(oτ )
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(Observation) Information Gain
24
A PREPRINT - MAY 12, 2020
It is also possible to factorised the biased generative model the other way around in terms of an unbiased likelihood
and biased states: p˜(oτ , xτ ) = p(oτ |xτ )p˜(xτ ). This different factorisation leads to a new decomposition in terms of
risk and ambiguity, as well as potentially different behaviour due to the change from desired observations to desired
states.
G(pi)τ = EQ(oτ ,xτ |pi)[lnQ(xτ |pi)− ln p˜(oτ , xτ )]
= EQ(oτ ,xτ |pi)[lnQ(xτ |pi)− ln p(oτ |xτ )− ln p˜(xτ )]
= EQ(xτ |pi)H[p(oτ |xτ )]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ambiguity
+DKL
[
Q(xτ |pi)‖p˜(xτ |pi)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Risk
Here the agent is driven to minimize the divergence between desired and prior expected states, while also trying
to minimize the entropy of the observations it receives. This drives the agent to try to sample observations with a
minimally complex mapping back to states.
This formulation is mathematically equivalent to the previous decompositions despite defining desired states instead
of desired observations, as can be seen with the following manipulations:
G(pi)τ = EQ(xτ |pi)H[p(oτ |xτ |pi)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ambiguity
+DKL
[
Q(xτ |pi)‖p˜(xτ )
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Risk
= EQ(oτ ,xτ |pi)[lnQ(xτ |pi)− ln p(oτ |xτ )− lnQ(xτ |oτ )− ln p˜(oτ ) + ln p(oτ |xτ )]
= −EQ(oτ ,xτ |pi)
[
ln p˜(oτ )
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Extrinsic Value
−EQ(oτ )DKL[Q(xτ |oτ )||Q(xτ |pi)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Epistemic Value
= G(pi)τ
The risk-ambiguity formulation has very close relations to KL control (K. Rawlik et al., 2013), in that it encompasses
KL control with an additional "epistemic" ambiguity term.
G(pi)τ = EQ(xτ |pi)H[p(oτ |xτ )] +DKL
[
Q(xτ |pi)‖p˜(xτ )
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
KL Control︸ ︷︷ ︸
Active Inference
C Trajectory Derivation of the Expected Model Evidence
Here we present the derivation of the free energy of the future (FEF) from the expected model evidence for the
full trajectory distribution rather than a single time-step. Importantly, we show that with a temporal mean-field
approximation on the approximate posterior: p(x1:T |o1:T ) ≈
∏T
t p(xt|ot), and the assumption that desired obser-
vations are independent in time: p˜(o1:T ) ≈
∏T
t p˜(ot), and given a Markovian generative model, then the trajec-
tory distribution factorises into a sum of individual time-steps, only dependent on the past through the prior term
p(xt) = EQ(xt−1|ot−1)[p(xt|xt−1)]. We name this final approximation the factorization approximation, and it simply
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states that your prior at the current time-step is based on the posterior of the previous time-step mapped through the
transition dynamics.
argmin
pi
Ep(o1:T ))[ln p˜(o1:T )] = Ep(o1:T )) ln
∫
dx1:T p˜(o1:T , x1:T )
= Ep(o1:T )) ln
∫
dx1:T
p˜(o1:T , x1:T )Q(x1:T |o1:T )
Q(x1:T |o1:T )
= Ep(o1:T )) ln
∫
dx1:T
T∏
t
p˜(ot, xt)Q(xt|ot)
Q(xt|ot)
= Ep(o1:T )) ln
∫
dx1:T
T∏
t
p˜(ot|xt)EQ(xt−1|ot−1)p(xt|xt−1)Q(xt|ot)
Q(xt|ot)
= Ep(o1:T ))
t∑
t
ln
∫
dxt
p˜(ot|xt)EQ(xt−1|ot−1)
[
p(xt|xt−1)Q(xt|ot)
]
Q(xt|ot)
≤
t∑
t
Ep(o1:T ))
∫
dxtQ(xt|ot) ln
p˜(ot|xt)EQ(xt−1|ot−1)[p(xt|xt−1)]
Q(xt|ot)
≤
t∑
t
∫
dxt
∫
do1:T Q(o1:T , xt)) ln
p˜(ot|xt)EQ(xt−1|ot−1)[p(xt|xt−1)]
Q(xt|ot)
≤
t∑
t
EQ(ot,xt,)) ln
p˜(ot|xt)EQ(xt−1|ot−1)[p(xt|xt−1)]
Q(xt|ot)
≤
t∑
t
EQ(ot,xt) ln p˜(pt|xt)−
t∑
t
Ep(ot)DKL[p(xt|ot)||EQ(xt−1|ot−1)[p(xt|xt−1)]]
≤
t∑
t
FEFt
The trajectory derivation of the FEEF follows an almost identical scheme to that of the FEF. The only difference is that
now the term inside the log also contains an additional− ln p˜(o), which is then combined with the likelihood from the
generative model to form the extrinsic-value KL divergence.
D EFE Bound on the Negative Log Model Evidence
It is important to note that the EFE is also a bound on the negative log model evidence, but a lower bound, not an upper
bound. This means that, in theory, one should want to maximize the EFE, rather than minimize it, to make the bound
as tight as possible.
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The fact that the EFE is an upper bound is straightforward to demonstrate, since the extrinsic value term of the EFE
simply is the log model evidence.
G(pi)τ = EQ(oτ ,xτ)[lnQ(xτ |pi)− ln p˜(oτ , xτ )]
≈ EQ(oτ ,xτ)[lnQ(xτ |pi)− lnQ(xτ |oτ )− ln p˜(oτ )]
≈ −EQ(oτ )[ln p˜(oτ )]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected Log Model Evidence
−Ep(oτ )DKL[Q(xτ |oτ )‖Q(xτ |pi)]|︸ ︷︷ ︸
Information Gain
This derivation assumes that the true and approximate posteriors are approximately equal p(xτ |oτ ) ≈ Q(xτ |oτ ),
which effectively means that this condition is only true after the variational inference process is complete.
We wish to minimize both log model evidence, and minimize the EFE. Since the information gain term is a KL
divergence, which is always≥ 0, and we have a negative information gain term, this means that the EFE is always less
than the log model evidence and so is a lower bound. However, this bound becomes tight when the information gain
is 0, so to maximally tighten the bound we wish to reduce the information gain, while the EFE demands we maximize
it. In effect, this means that the EFE bound is the wrong way around.
We can see this more clearly when we retrace the logic for the FEF. From equation 4, we have that the FEF is an upper
bound on the negative log model evidence. This means that minimizing the FEF necessarily tightens the bound, while
this is not true of the EFE lower bound, where minimizing the EFE can actually cause it to diverge from the log model
evidence. We can see this even more clearly by doing an analogous decomposition of the FEF.
FEF = EQ(oτ ,xτ )[lnQ(xτ |oτ )− ln p˜(oτ , xτ )]
= EQ(oτ ,xτ )[lnQ(xτ |oτ )− ln p(xτ |oτ )− ln p˜(oτ )]
= −EQ(oτ )[ln p˜(oτ )]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected Log Model Evidence
+Ep(oτ )DKL[Q(xτ |oτ )‖p(xτ |oτ )]|︸ ︷︷ ︸
Posterior Approximation Error
Here, since the KL is between the generative model and the approximate posterior, and we then decompose the genera-
tive model into a true posterior and marginal, we can no longer make the assumption, made in the EFE derivation, that
the true and approximate posterior are approximately equal, since that would leave us with only the model evidence.
Therefore, instead we get a posterior approximation error term which is the KL divergence between the approximate
and true posteriors. When the true and approximate posterior are equal, we are just left with the log model evidence.
Since, the posterior approximation error is always ≥ 0, then the FEF is an upper bound on the negative log model
evidence, and thus by minimizing the FEF, we make the bound tighter. This logic is essentially a reprise of the standard
variational inference logic from a slightly different perspective.
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If we do not make the assumption in the EFE that the approximate and true posterior are the same, we can derive a
similar expression to the EFE which will shed more light on the relation.
G(pi)τ = EQ(oτ ,xτ )[lnQ(xτ |pi)− ln p˜(oτ , xτ )]
= EQ(oτ ,xτ )[lnQ(xτ |pi)− ln p(xτ |oτ )− ln p˜(oτ )]
= EQ(oτ ,xτ )[lnQ(xτ |pi)− ln p(xτ |oτ )− ln p˜(oτ ) + lnQ(xτ |oτ )− lnQ(xτ |oτ )]
= −EQ(oτ )[ln p˜(oτ )]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected Log Model Evidence
+EQ(o)DKL[Q(xτ |oτ )‖p(xτ |oτ )]|︸ ︷︷ ︸
Posterior Approximation Error︸ ︷︷ ︸
FEF
−EQ(o)DKL[Q(xτ |oτ )‖Q(xτ |pi)]|︸ ︷︷ ︸
Information Gain
Without the true posterior assumption, we thus find that the EFE could be both an upper or a lower bound on the log
model evidence, since the two additional KL divergence terms have opposite signs. If the posterior approximation error
is larger than the information gain, then the EFE functions correctly as an upper bound. However, if the information
gain is larger, then the EFE will become a lower bound and could diverge from the log model evidence. Moreover, this
latter situation is more likely, since the goal of variational inference is to reduce the approximation error, while EFE
agents seek to maximize information gain. This means that the EFE only functions correctly as an upper bound on log
model evidence during the early stages of optimizationwhere the posterior approximation is poor. Further optimization
steps likely drive the EFE further away from the model evidence. The bound is tight when the information gain equals
the posterior approximation error. We can also see that the first two terms of the EFE is simply the FEF. We have thus
rederived by a rather roundabout route, the fact that the EFE is simply the FEF minus the information gain.
We thus see that the EFE as a bound on the log model evidence is shaky, since it depends on the information gain
always being larger or smaller than the posterior approximation error. Moreover, the bounding behaviour seems to
emerge directly from the relation of the EFE to the FEF rather than the intrinsic qualities of the EFE, and it is primarily
the information-seeking properties of the EFE which serve to damage the clean bounding behaviour of the FEF.
E Attempts at Naturalising the EFE
In this Appendix, we review several attempts to derive the EFE directly from the expected model evidence.
Since we have derived the FEF by importance sampling the expected model evidence with the approximate posterior,
one obvious avenue would be to importance sample on the variational prior instead. Following this line of thought
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gives us:
−Ep(oτ )[ln p˜(oτ )] = −Ep(oτ )[ln
∫
dxp˜(oτ , xτ )]
= −Ep(oτ )[ln
∫
dxτ p˜(oτ , xτ )
Q(xτ |pi)
Q(xτ |pi)
]
≤ −Ep(oτ )[
∫
dxτQ(xτ |pi) ln
p˜(oτ , xτ )
Q(xτ |pi)
]
≤ −Ep(oτ )Q(xτ |pi)[ln
p˜(oτ , xτ )
Q(xτ |pi)
]
≤ −Ep(oτ )Q(xτ |pi)[lnQ(xτ |pi)− ln p˜(oτ , xτ )]
While this approach gets the correct form of the EFE inside the expectation, the expectation itself is the product of the
two marginals rather than the joint required for the full EFE. While this may seem minor, this difference must underpin
all the other differences and relations we have explored throughout this paper.
To get to the full EFE we must make some assumption to allow us to combine the expectation under two marginals
into an expectation under the joint. The first and simplest assumption is that they simply are the same such that the
joint factorises into the two marginals – Q(oτ , xτ |pi) ≈ p(oτ )Q(xτ |pi). This assumption is equivalent to assuming
independence of observations and latent states, which rather defeats the point of a latent variable model.
A second approach is to assume that the variational prior equals the variational posterior Q(xτ |pi) ≈ Q(xτ |oτ ). This
allows you then to combine the marginal and posterior into a joint, giving the EFE as desired. However this assumption
has several unfortunate consequences. Firstly, it eliminates the entire idea of inference, since the prior and posterior
are assumed to be the same, thus no real inference can have taken place. This is not necessarily an issue if we separate
the inference and planning stages of the algorithm, such that they optimize different objective functions. However
it is more elegant, as the FEEF does, to be able to use the same objective function for both planning and inference,
thus casting them as simply different facets of the same underlying process. A more serious consequence is that this
assumption also eliminates the information gain term in active inference – since the prior and posterior are assumed to
be the same, the divergence between them (which is the information gain), must be zero.
A slightly different approach is taken in a proof in (Parr, 2019), which begins with the KL divergence between two
distributions, one encoding beliefs about future states and observations, and the other being the biased generative
model. By definition, this KL divergence is always ≥ 0, which allows us to write.
DKL[p(oτ , xτ |pi)‖p˜(oτ , xτ )] ≥ 0
= Ep(oτ |pi)DKL[p(xτ |oτ )‖p˜(oτ , xτ )]− Ep(oτ |pi)[ln p(oτ |pi)] ≥ 0
⇒ −Ep(oτ |pi)DKL[p(xτ |oτ )‖p˜(oτ , xτ )] ≥ −Ep(oτ |pi)[ln p(oτ |pi)]
⇒ FEF ≥ −Ep(oτ |pi)[ln p(oτ |pi)]
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Under the assumption that p(xτ |oτ ) ≈ Q(xτ |pi), this becomes:
− Ep(oτ |pi)DKL[p(xτ |oτ )‖p˜(oτ , xτ )] ≥ −Ep(oτ |pi)[ln p(oτ |pi)]
≈ Ep(oτ |pi)DKL[Q(xτ |pi)‖p˜(oτ , xτ )] ≥ −Ep(oτ |pi)[ln p(oτ |pi)]
≈ EFE ≥ −Ep(oτ |pi)[ln p(oτ |pi)]
This proof derives the FEF not as a bound on the expected model evidence, by our definition, but rather as a bound
on the entropy of expected observations given a policy. The EFE is then derived from the FEF by assuming that
the prior and posterior are the same, which comes with all the drawbacks explained above. This proof is primarily
unworkable because of the assumption that the prior and the posterior are identical. While this may be arguable in
the continuous time limit, where it is equivalent to the assumption that that
dQ(xτ |o]tau)
dt
≈ 0, which is when the
continuous-time inference has reached an equilibrium, it is definitely not true in discrete time, where although there is
a relation between the prior in the current time-step and the posterior in the previous one, it must be mapped through
the transition dynamics – Q(xt|pi) = EQ(xt−1)[p(xt|xt−1, pi)].
One can also attempt a related proof by splitting the KL divergence the other way. This gives you:
DKL[p(oτ , xτ |pi)‖p˜(oτ , xτ )] ≥ 0
= DKL[p(oτ , xτ |pi)‖p˜(xτ |oτ )]−Ep(oτ |pi)[ln p˜(oτ )] ≥ 0
⇒ −DKL[p(oτ , xτ |pi)‖p˜(xτ |oτ )] ≥ −Ep(oτ |pi)[ln p˜(oτ )]
⇒ Ep(xτ |pi)[ln p(oτ |xτ )] +Ep(oτ |pi)DKL[p(xτ |oτ )‖p˜(xτ |pi)] ≥ −Ep(oτ |pi)[ln p˜(oτ )]
⇒ FEF ≥ −Ep(oτ |pi)[ln p˜(oτ )]
Which is just another way of showing that the FEF is a bound on the expected model evidence.
F Related Quantites
Recently a new free-energy, the generalised free energy (GFE) (Parr & Friston, 2019), has been proposed in the lit-
erature as an alternative or an extension to the EFE. The GFE shares some close similarities with the FEEF. Both
fundamentally extend the EFE by proposing a unified objective function which is valid for both inferencce at the cur-
rent time and planning into the future, whereas the EFE can only be used for planning. Moreover, both GFE and FEEF
encode future observations as latent unobserved variables, over which posterior beliefs can be formed. Moreover
agents maintain prior beliefs over these variables which encode its preferences or desires.
The generalised free energy is defined as
GFE = EQ(oτ ,xτ )[logQ(oτ ) + logQ(xτ )− log p˜(oτ , xτ )]
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Whereas the FEEF is defined as
FEEF = EQ(oτ ,xτ )[logQ(oτ , xτ )− log p˜(oτ , xτ )]
There are two key differences mathematically and intuitively between the GFE and the FEEF. The first is that the GFE
maintains a factorised posterior over beliefs and observations, where the posterior beliefs of the two are separated by a
mean field approximation and assumed to be separate. By contrast the FEEF maintains a joint approximate belief over
both observations and states simultaneously. This joint in the case of the FEEF effectively functions as a veridicial
generative model since Q(oτ |xτ ) = p(oτ |xτ ) and Q(xτ |pi) = EQ(xτ−1)[p(xτ |xτ−1, pi)]. This means that posterior
beliefs of the future are computed simply by rolling forward the generative model given the beliefs about the current
time.
A second and more important differences lies in the generative models. The GFE assumes that the agent is only
equipped with a single generative model with both veridicial and biased components. The preferences of an EFE
agent are encoded as a separate factorisable marginal over observations. This means that the generative model of
the GFE agent factorises as p˜(oτ , xτ )GFE ∝ p(oτ |xτ )p(xτ )p˜(oτ ). This means that for the GFE the likelihood and
the prior are unbiased and there is simply an additional prior preferences term in the free-energy expression. By
contrast, the FEEF eschews this unusual factorisation of the generative model and instead presupposes a separate
warped generative model for use in the future which is intrinsically biased. The biased generative model in the FEEF
thus decomposes as p˜(oτ , xτ )FEEF = p˜(oτ |xτ )p˜(xτ ), which is the standard factorisation of the joint distribution in a
generative model, but where both the likelihood and prior distributions are biased towards generating more favourable
states of affairs for the agent. This inherent optimism bias then drives action.
A further free-energy proposed in the literature has been the Bethe free-energy and the Bethe approximation
(Schwöbel, Kiebel, & Markovic´, 2018). This approach eschews the standard mean field assumption on the approx-
imate posterior in favour of a Bethe approximation from statistical physics (Yedidia, Freeman, & Weiss, 2001, 2005)
which instead represents the approximate posterior as the product of pairwise marginals, thus preserving a constraint
of pairwise temporal consistency which the mean-field assumption lacks. Due to this greater representation of tempo-
ral constraints (the approximate posteriors at each time-step being no longer assumed to be independent), the Bethe
free-energy has the potential to be significantly more accurate than the standard mean-field variational free energy
(and is, in fact, exact for factor graphs without cycles such as the standard non-hierarchical POMDP model). In this
paper, we focus entirely on the standard mean-field variational free-energy used in the vast majority of active inference
publications, and thus the Bethe free-energy is out of scope for this paper. However, exploring the nature of any intrin-
sic terms which might arise from the Bethe free-energy is an interesting avenue for future work. Although primarily
focused on the Bethe free-energy, Schwöbel et al. (2018) also introduced a ’predicted free energy’ functional. This
functional is equivalent to the FEF as we have defined it here, and so has a complexity instead of an information gain
term, leading to minimizing the prior-posterior divergence.
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Finally, Biehl et al. (2018) suggested that if the EFE is not mandated by the free-energy principle, which we have
argued for in this paper, then in theory any standard intrinsic measure, such as empowerment, could be used as an
objective. We believe that exploring the effect of these other potential loss functions could be a area of great interest
for future work.
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